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Accounting Control Essays

Case report: Kooistra Autogroep September 2014, Accounting and Control, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen Authors: Cees Schonenberg 0709565 Laura Elferink 4036662 Wytse Versantvoort 4055489 Case report: Kooistra Autogroep September 2014, Accounting and Control, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen Authors: Cees Schonenberg 0709565 Laura Elferink 4036662 Wytse Versantvoort 4055489 Introduction Kooistra autogroep is a large car dealership which deals in multiple brands across the Netherlands. Most car departments sell multiple brands, which was pretty unique compared to the average dealership in the Netherlands. Next to the car dealerships, Kooistra autogroep also included a body repair shop and a car lease company. In 2002, a new general manager was introduced at Kooistra autogroep. The former CEO made room for his son, Tom, to run the business. Before 2002, the decision making within Kooistra was centralized. The former CEO had made most of the operational decisions for the car departments. However, from 2002, Tom wanted to change things in Kooistra autogroep and introduced decentralized decision making. To support this change, Tom also introduced three performance measurement systems (PMS): Performance reporting, budgeting and pay-for performance. This paper will discuss the decentralization of decision making and will critically analyze the three performance measurement systems. Recommendations regarding the implementation of these systems will be made where needed. Decentralization With the change from centralized to decentralized decision making came a lot of responsibilities for the middle management of Kooistra. Before 2002, they had no to little decision making regarding their personnel, advertising, investments and prices of the cars. This also meant that they were inexperienced in these fields and actually needed guidance. Thus, this was a radical and important change project for Kooistra autogroep. However, the support for management was minimum: no trainings were given and managers just had to save themselves. Tom and his CFO, Anne measured the performance of the managers with the three PMS mentioned above. Only with budgeting affairs, Tom and Anne offered some help, which often resulted in heavy discussions about the budget and the car department. Tom said that the decentralization was a good step forward for Kooistra, however, there are also some negative aspects about decentralizing decision makings. We will first discuss the pro’s and con’s of decentralization with regard to Kooistra and then determine whether the CEO went too far in this decentralization or not. First, an important aspect of decentralization is (bounded) rationality. ‘Human behaviour is intendedly rational, but only limited so’ (Simon, 1961). Due to information overflow and the limited capacity of the human brain, not all alternatives to a problem can be considered. In a growing organization, this bounded rationality becomes more and more visible. The CEO can’t oversee every department and can’t optimize decision making. Decentralization takes this bounded rationality into account and spreads decision making. This leads to more optimal decisions. Second, decentralized decision making leads to a more flexible and market-based approach. Because decision making is decentralized, market specific information reaches decision makers more easily. Case report: Kooistra Autogroep September 2014, Accounting and Control, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen Authors: Cees Schonenberg 0709565 Laura Elferink 4036662 Wytse Versantvoort 4055489 Introduction Kooistra autogroep is a large car dealership which deals in multiple brands across the Netherlands. Most car departments sell multiple brands, which was pretty unique compared to the average dealership in the Netherlands. Next to the car dealerships, Kooistra autogroep also included a body repair shop and a car lease company. In 2002, a new general manager was introduced at Kooistra autogroep. The former CEO made room for his son, Tom, to run the business. Before 2002, the decision making within Kooistra was centralized. The former CEO had made most of the operational decisions for the car departments. However, from 2002, Tom wanted to change things in Kooistra autogroep and introduced decentralized decision making. To support this change, Tom also introduced three performance measurement systems (PMS): Performance reporting, budgeting and pay-for performance. This paper will discuss the decentralization of decision making and will critically analyze the three performance measurement systems. Recommendations regarding the implementation of these systems will be made where needed. Decentralization With the change from centralized to decentralized decision making came a lot of responsibilities for the middle management of Kooistra. Before 2002, they had no to little decision making regarding their personnel, advertising, investments and prices of the cars. This also meant that they were inexperienced in these fields and actually needed guidance. Thus, this was a radical and important change project for Kooistra autogroep. However, the support for management was minimum: no trainings were given and managers just had to save themselves. Tom and his CFO, Anne measured the performance of the managers with the three PMS mentioned above. Only with budgeting affairs, Tom and Anne offered some help, which often resulted in heavy discussions about the budget and the car department. Tom said that the decentralization was a good step forward for Kooistra, however, there are also some negative aspects about decentralizing decision makings. We will first discuss the pro’s and con’s of decentralization with regard to Kooistra and then determine whether the CEO went too far in this decentralization or not. First, an important aspect of decentralization is (bounded) rationality. ‘Human behaviour is intendedly rational, but only limited so’ (Simon, 1961). Due to information overflow and the limited capacity of the human brain, not all alternatives to a problem can be considered. In a growing organization, this bounded rationality becomes more and more visible. The CEO can’t oversee every department and can’t optimize decision making. Decentralization takes this bounded rationality into account and spreads decision making. This leads to more optimal decisions. Second, decentralized decision making leads to a more flexible and market-based approach. Because decision making is decentralized, market specific information reaches decision makers more easily. Decision makers can include this information in their decisions and this leads to a more adaptive approach to their environment. However, decentralization also has its disadvantages. First, decentralization needs more managing and thus brings extra costs, this is due to the fact that the span of control becomes lower. Whereas all employees first reported to a single manager, the employees are now divided between managers and these managers report to their own manager. Second, decentralized decision making can lead to sub-optimal decisions: decisions that are optimal for a certain part of the firm, but not optimal for the company at large. Especially when targets need to be achieved, managers tend to optimize decisions for their department, not for the company at large. Kooistra did not go too far in their decentralization. Due to bounded rationality, it’s impossible to keep the decision making as centralized as they had before. Furthermore, the middle management can oversee their market better than top-management can. Information will flow to the decision makers more directly and less distorted. These advantages outweigh the disadvantages. However, we have some recommendations to the implementation of this decentralization. It went way too fast for the managers of Kooistra autogroep: Managers were inexperienced in all the extra responsibilities they had been given, which will lead to both inefficient decision making in both the short and long term. They should have got coaching and training in the process of decision making. As stated before, decentralizing decision making is a radical process which should go step by step. Performance reporting With Tom becoming the CEO of Kooistra Autogroep the performance reporting and management changed. He introduced a system which included financial and nonfinancial information. One of the reports he introduced was the balanced scorecard. This report included information about sales, services, inventory, etcetera. It also included the target for that year, how far the dealership was already meeting this target in percentages and how much time was already passed. So in one look management could see if the dealership was performing as targeted. These reports had to be handed over every week. The advantages of this report is that management have an up to date look about every dealership. So they can react fast if a dealership is performing under target. Another advantages of this scorecard is that it gives an easy image of the performance of a dealership. The disadvantage is that a managers have to make a report every week. With a sales target of 250 in one year this means they sell about 5 cars a week. So every week a managers has to make a report for 5 cars average. Off course this cost some time which could be used for other issues. So it could be more efficient if this scorecard has to be made every month instead of every week. This means that management have a lesser up to date look about a dealership, but this look should good enough for the decision they have to make. Budgeting The budget information which had to be generated was about financial and nonfinancial information. The main focus of the budgeting process was about determining the net profit targets for the next year. In line with the change to a more decentralized decision making authority, the budgeting was also more decentralized. The managers of the dealerships were asked to make their own budget Case report: Kooistra Autogroep September 2014, Accounting and Control, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen Authors: Cees Schonenberg 0709565 Laura Elferink 4036662 Wytse Versantvoort 4055489 Introduction Kooistra autogroep is a large car dealership which deals in multiple brands across the Netherlands. Most car departments sell multiple brands, which was pretty unique compared to the average dealership in the Netherlands. Next to the car dealerships, Kooistra autogroep also included a body repair shop and a car lease company. In 2002, a new general manager was introduced at Kooistra autogroep. The former CEO made room for his son, Tom, to run the business. Before 2002, the decision making within Kooistra was centralized. The former CEO had made most of the operational decisions for the car departments. However, from 2002, Tom wanted to change things in Kooistra autogroep and introduced decentralized decision making. To support this change, Tom also introduced three performance measurement systems (PMS): Performance reporting, budgeting and pay-for performance. This paper will discuss the decentralization of decision making and will critically analyze the three performance measurement systems. Recommendations regarding the implementation of these systems will be made where needed. Decentralization With the change from centralized to decentralized decision making came a lot of responsibilities for the middle management of Kooistra. Before 2002, they had no to little decision making regarding their personnel, advertising, investments and prices of the cars. This also meant that they were inexperienced in these fields and actually needed guidance. Thus, this was a radical and important change project for Kooistra autogroep. However, the support for management was minimum: no trainings were given and managers just had to save themselves. Tom and his CFO, Anne measured the performance of the managers with the three PMS mentioned above. Only with budgeting affairs, Tom and Anne offered some help, which often resulted in heavy discussions about the budget and the car department. Tom said that the decentralization was a good step forward for Kooistra, however, there are also some negative aspects about decentralizing decision makings. We will first discuss the pro’s and con’s of decentralization with regard to Kooistra and then determine whether the CEO went too far in this decentralization or not. First, an important aspect of decentralization is (bounded) rationality. ‘Human behaviour is intendedly rational, but only limited so’ (Simon, 1961). Due to information overflow and the limited capacity of the human brain, not all alternatives to a problem can be considered. In a growing organization, this bounded rationality becomes more and more visible. The CEO can’t oversee every department and can’t optimize decision making. Decentralization takes this bounded rationality into account and spreads decision making. This leads to more optimal decisions. Second, decentralized decision making leads to a more flexible and market-based approach. Because decision making is decentralized, market specific information reaches decision makers more easily. Decision makers can include this information in their decisions and this leads to a more adaptive approach to their environment. However, decentralization also has its disadvantages. First, decentralization needs more managing and thus brings extra costs, this is due to the fact that the span of control becomes lower. Whereas all employees first reported to a single manager, the employees are now divided between managers and these managers report to their own manager. Second, decentralized decision making can lead to sub-optimal decisions: decisions that are optimal for a certain part of the firm, but not optimal for the company at large. Especially when targets need to be achieved, managers tend to optimize decisions for their department, not for the company at large. Kooistra did not go too far in their decentralization. Due to bounded rationality, it’s impossible to keep the decision making as centralized as they had before. Furthermore, the middle management can oversee their market better than top-management can. Information will flow to the decision makers more directly and less distorted. These advantages outweigh the disadvantages. However, we have some recommendations to the implementation of this decentralization. It went way too fast for the managers of Kooistra autogroep: Managers were inexperienced in all the extra responsibilities they had been given, which will lead to both inefficient decision making in both the short and long term. They should have got coaching and training in the process of decision making. As stated before, decentralizing decision making is a radical process which should go step by step. Performance reporting With Tom becoming the CEO of Kooistra Autogroep the performance reporting and management changed. He introduced a system which included financial and nonfinancial information. One of the reports he introduced was the balanced scorecard. This report included information about sales, services, inventory, etcetera. It also included the target for that year, how far the dealership was already meeting this target in percentages and how much time was already passed. So in one look management could see if the dealership was performing as targeted. These reports had to be handed over every week. The advantages of this report is that management have an up to date look about every dealership. So they can react fast if a dealership is performing under target. Another advantages of this scorecard is that it gives an easy image of the performance of a dealership. The disadvantage is that a managers have to make a report every week. With a sales target of 250 in one year this means they sell about 5 cars a week. So every week a managers has to make a report for 5 cars average. Off course this cost some time which could be used for other issues. So it could be more efficient if this scorecard has to be made every month instead of every week. This means that management have a lesser up to date look about a dealership, but this look should good enough for the decision they have to make. Budgeting The budget information which had to be generated was about financial and nonfinancial information. The main focus of the budgeting process was about determining the net profit targets for the next year. In line with the change to a more decentralized decision making authority, the budgeting was also more decentralized. The managers of the dealerships were asked to make their own budget proposals. These proposals were reviewed by the CEO and the CFO and they determined the final budget. As an advantage dealership managers become more involved in the company and they could adjust the budget to the environment they were operating. The downside is that managers can undervalue their performance, so it becomes easier to meet their targets. As an advantage the CFO stated that in this way they can use the happy median. Managers think they can actually meet this target, so are more willing to commit to it. This could mean they are willing to work harder to meet this target. So this way the performance can be more stimulated, but the management should be aware of undervaluation by the dealership managers. So they should continue with reviewing the budget proposals. Pay for performance In the Netherlands the most common way of compensation for job performance is a previously established salary. If you perform well you could be promoted to a higher position, which included a higher salary. The use of bonuses was hardly used. For example a salesmen asked for a salary raise. Instead of the raise a bonus was offered which resulted in more money that the raise. The salesmen still asked for the raise, because the security of a steady income was preferred. This is the opinion of most employees. They believed that a bonus system could help to motivate their managers, but off course the targets set for a bonus must be realistic. If a manager think they could never met the target, why should they try it. When they believe they can meet the target, they will give a try because of the extra money. So the bonus system could work. Only the employees prefer a steady income over a bonus. If this raise means lower cost for the company they should consider to give a raise instead of the bonus. If a raise gives a bigger incentive this is also favorable for the company. Incentive pay at Kooistra autogroep The New CEO of Kooistra autogroep introduces pay-for performance(Herinafter: PFP). This included the expansion of a PFP system for sales people and the introduction of a PFP system for all the manager. The top managers of Kooistra acknowledges that the temporary sales bonus plan was limited in scope. The new PFP system added a bonus element to the managers’ compensation package. Target bonuses for dealership managers were set between 10-20% of their annual salary. For department managers this was respectively 8%. Moreover, the bonuses of the dealership and department managers were based on the extent to which the managers met their annual net profit targets as set during the budgeting process. In the opinion of the CEO and the CFO of the Kooistra Autogroep the bonuses had several advantages. First, they make managers conscious that some changes where introduced. The managers not only received more decision-making authority, but their responsibilities to meet expected performances increased as well. Moreover, they both expected an increase in the motivation. The CEO stated an increase of motivation, because of the money and because of the good feeling when achieving a target. The CFO added to those arguments that the likelihood of meeting their target is an important factor in motivating the employees. Effect of incentives PHT Vs Kooistra Autogroep Within the case of PHT, the bonuses where mostly 200-300% of the base salary of the employees. So the bigger part of their salary was gathered by receiving bonuses. This creates extrinsic motivation, Case report: Kooistra Autogroep September 2014, Accounting and Control, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen Authors: Cees Schonenberg 0709565 Laura Elferink 4036662 Wytse Versantvoort 4055489 Introduction Kooistra autogroep is a large car dealership which deals in multiple brands across the Netherlands. Most car departments sell multiple brands, which was pretty unique compared to the average dealership in the Netherlands. Next to the car dealerships, Kooistra autogroep also included a body repair shop and a car lease company. In 2002, a new general manager was introduced at Kooistra autogroep. The former CEO made room for his son, Tom, to run the business. Before 2002, the decision making within Kooistra was centralized. The former CEO had made most of the operational decisions for the car departments. However, from 2002, Tom wanted to change things in Kooistra autogroep and introduced decentralized decision making. To support this change, Tom also introduced three performance measurement systems (PMS): Performance reporting, budgeting and pay-for performance. This paper will discuss the decentralization of decision making and will critically analyze the three performance measurement systems. Recommendations regarding the implementation of these systems will be made where needed. Decentralization With the change from centralized to decentralized decision making came a lot of responsibilities for the middle management of Kooistra. Before 2002, they had no to little decision making regarding their personnel, advertising, investments and prices of the cars. This also meant that they were inexperienced in these fields and actually needed guidance. Thus, this was a radical and important change project for Kooistra autogroep. However, the support for management was minimum: no trainings were given and managers just had to save themselves. Tom and his CFO, Anne measured the performance of the managers with the three PMS mentioned above. Only with budgeting affairs, Tom and Anne offered some help, which often resulted in heavy discussions about the budget and the car department. Tom said that the decentralization was a good step forward for Kooistra, however, there are also some negative aspects about decentralizing decision makings. We will first discuss the pro’s and con’s of decentralization with regard to Kooistra and then determine whether the CEO went too far in this decentralization or not. First, an important aspect of decentralization is (bounded) rationality. ‘Human behaviour is intendedly rational, but only limited so’ (Simon, 1961). Due to information overflow and the limited capacity of the human brain, not all alternatives to a problem can be considered. In a growing organization, this bounded rationality becomes more and more visible. The CEO can’t oversee every department and can’t optimize decision making. Decentralization takes this bounded rationality into account and spreads decision making. This leads to more optimal decisions. Second, decentralized decision making leads to a more flexible and market-based approach. Because decision making is decentralized, market specific information reaches decision makers more easily. Decision makers can include this information in their decisions and this leads to a more adaptive approach to their environment. However, decentralization also has its disadvantages. First, decentralization needs more managing and thus brings extra costs, this is due to the fact that the span of control becomes lower. Whereas all employees first reported to a single manager, the employees are now divided between managers and these managers report to their own manager. Second, decentralized decision making can lead to sub-optimal decisions: decisions that are optimal for a certain part of the firm, but not optimal for the company at large. Especially when targets need to be achieved, managers tend to optimize decisions for their department, not for the company at large. Kooistra did not go too far in their decentralization. Due to bounded rationality, it’s impossible to keep the decision making as centralized as they had before. Furthermore, the middle management can oversee their market better than top-management can. Information will flow to the decision makers more directly and less distorted. These advantages outweigh the disadvantages. However, we have some recommendations to the implementation of this decentralization. It went way too fast for the managers of Kooistra autogroep: Managers were inexperienced in all the extra responsibilities they had been given, which will lead to both inefficient decision making in both the short and long term. They should have got coaching and training in the process of decision making. As stated before, decentralizing decision making is a radical process which should go step by step. Performance reporting With Tom becoming the CEO of Kooistra Autogroep the performance reporting and management changed. He introduced a system which included financial and nonfinancial information. One of the reports he introduced was the balanced scorecard. This report included information about sales, services, inventory, etcetera. It also included the target for that year, how far the dealership was already meeting this target in percentages and how much time was already passed. So in one look management could see if the dealership was performing as targeted. These reports had to be handed over every week. The advantages of this report is that management have an up to date look about every dealership. So they can react fast if a dealership is performing under target. Another advantages of this scorecard is that it gives an easy image of the performance of a dealership. The disadvantage is that a managers have to make a report every week. With a sales target of 250 in one year this means they sell about 5 cars a week. So every week a managers has to make a report for 5 cars average. Off course this cost some time which could be used for other issues. So it could be more efficient if this scorecard has to be made every month instead of every week. This means that management have a lesser up to date look about a dealership, but this look should good enough for the decision they have to make. Budgeting The budget information which had to be generated was about financial and nonfinancial information. The main focus of the budgeting process was about determining the net profit targets for the next year. In line with the change to a more decentralized decision making authority, the budgeting was also more decentralized. The managers of the dealerships were asked to make their own budget proposals. These proposals were reviewed by the CEO and the CFO and they determined the final budget. As an advantage dealership managers become more involved in the company and they could adjust the budget to the environment they were operating. The downside is that managers can undervalue their performance, so it becomes easier to meet their targets. As an advantage the CFO stated that in this way they can use the happy median. Managers think they can actually meet this target, so are more willing to commit to it. This could mean they are willing to work harder to meet this target. So this way the performance can be more stimulated, but the management should be aware of undervaluation by the dealership managers. So they should continue with reviewing the budget proposals. Pay for performance In the Netherlands the most common way of compensation for job performance is a previously established salary. If you perform well you could be promoted to a higher position, which included a higher salary. The use of bonuses was hardly used. For example a salesmen asked for a salary raise. Instead of the raise a bonus was offered which resulted in more money that the raise. The salesmen still asked for the raise, because the security of a steady income was preferred. This is the opinion of most employees. They believed that a bonus system could help to motivate their managers, but off course the targets set for a bonus must be realistic. If a manager think they could never met the target, why should they try it. When they believe they can meet the target, they will give a try because of the extra money. So the bonus system could work. Only the employees prefer a steady income over a bonus. If this raise means lower cost for the company they should consider to give a raise instead of the bonus. If a raise gives a bigger incentive this is also favorable for the company. Incentive pay at Kooistra autogroep The New CEO of Kooistra autogroep introduces pay-for performance(Herinafter: PFP). This included the expansion of a PFP system for sales people and the introduction of a PFP system for all the manager. The top managers of Kooistra acknowledges that the temporary sales bonus plan was limited in scope. The new PFP system added a bonus element to the managers’ compensation package. Target bonuses for dealership managers were set between 10-20% of their annual salary. For department managers this was respectively 8%. Moreover, the bonuses of the dealership and department managers were based on the extent to which the managers met their annual net profit targets as set during the budgeting process. In the opinion of the CEO and the CFO of the Kooistra Autogroep the bonuses had several advantages. First, they make managers conscious that some changes where introduced. The managers not only received more decision-making authority, but their responsibilities to meet expected performances increased as well. Moreover, they both expected an increase in the motivation. The CEO stated an increase of motivation, because of the money and because of the good feeling when achieving a target. The CFO added to those arguments that the likelihood of meeting their target is an important factor in motivating the employees. Effect of incentives PHT Vs Kooistra Autogroep Within the case of PHT, the bonuses where mostly 200-300% of the base salary of the employees. So the bigger part of their salary was gathered by receiving bonuses. This creates extrinsic motivation, which means that employees are motivated to work hard to get the extensive salary payments. In the case of Kooistra autogroep, de bonus is between 8-20% depending on the function. Therefore the bonus system does not provide the same extrinsic motivation as the bonus system of the PHT case. The motivation of the employees at Kooistra autogroep is still based on intrinsic motivation, which means that they want to work hard in order to reach the business goal instead of individual goals. Therefore it can be questioned if a bonus system works in a company where the culture is that employees work for the business goals instead of individual goals. When the employees get a raise over their fixed salary it might improve the motivation, because they feel more rewarded for working hard. A bonus system only rewards you when you work hard every time, so that will probably feel more like a reward which is earned by themselves instead of given by the manager, because he or she appreciates you. Benefits of incentive pay Within the agency theory is explained that within an organization agents behave opportunistic towards principals. A way of reducing this opportunistic behavior is to introduce bonus payments. It is in the agents own interest to work hard, because than they receive a bigger salary payment. Conducting from this theory we can argue that one of the benefits of incentive pay is that it reduces opportunistic behavior. Moreover, employees mat potentially feel rewarded and appreciated for their effort. In our opinion this will mostly be the case when raising the fixed salary, but as the CEO in de Kooistra Autogroep case mentioned, employees can get a good feeling when achieving targets and as a result feel rewarded when they receive a bonus for the achieved target. So a second benefit could be employees satisfaction. A third benefit is that a PFP system reduces the companies risk. When times are tough for the company the salaries are lower, because employees will not be able to reach their targets. So the level of wages are related to the level of profit.

Help

Citron, D.B. (1995). Positive accounting theory and the study of corporate control: the role of loan covenants and the going concern qualification. (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City University London)

Abstract

This thesis comprises four published papers (the Papers) - three on accounting-based loan covenants and one on the going concern qualification (GCQ) - plus a linking essay. The essay focuses on the Papers' common subject matter of corporate control and on their common research methodology, positive accounting theory. The essay shows how the agency literature is closely bound up with problems of corporate control. It goes on to argue that certain features of positive accounting theory - its recognition of conflict and of institutional influences, and its focus on economic incentives - render it a particularly useful framework for research into loan covenants and the GCQ. The loan covenant papers address both the structuring of loan agreements ('ex ante' issues) and the subsequent functioning of such agreements, in particular breaches of covenant ('ex post' issues). Their chief contribution to the 'ex ante' literature is the first evidence they provide on the extent and incidence of covenants in the UK; their UK/US comparison, drawing on institutional differences to explain why accounting-based covenants in the UK, unlike the US, have a positive association with term but no association with gearing; and their analysis of the incidence of accounting-based covenants in convertible and secured debt agreements. The Papers' findings on 'ex post' matters contain early evidence on the costliness of covenant breaches, on the effectiveness of managerial opportunism in avoiding covenant violations and on the costliness of mandatory accounting changes. In the context of loan covenants the essay also provides a methodological critique of positive accounting theory, which it sees as a developing research programme. This is reflected both in the ambiguous relation between accounting-based covenants and the investment opportunity set (which is resolved in this research for a UK setting), and in the 'ad hoc' nature of many arguments put forward by the theory's proponents to explain existing practice. Finally, the essay argues that the positive accounting theory and the decision-usefulness views of accounting have more in common than is sometimes supposed. The going concern paper addresses important issues of independence and disclosure. The essay discusses several possible explanations for the low GCQ rate among failed companies, adducing evidence from more recent research. The GCQ paper itself shows that, although the self-fulfilling prophecy argument and differential audit firm size do not appear to prejudice independence, auditor switching may pose such a threat. The essay concludes by pointing at directions for future research, in particular in areas with public policy implications, and by suggesting that greater use of a case study methodology could deepen our understanding of these issues.

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